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Introduction 
At the beginning of the ‘Preface’ to the third (1750) edition of 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, we find a response to an unnamed critic of his 
Reflections on Poetry (1735). Baumgarten reminds us that he had defined 
the poem as “perfect sensible speech” in his dissertation and says he still 
thinks this definition is correct. “However,” he complains,  
one critic wrote that I called a poem ‘perfectly sensible’ speech, and 
then twisted the very well-known meaning of perfect, a meaning quite 
well-known even among schoolboys studying philosophy, into that 
popular sense in which ‘perfectly’ can sometimes be substituted for 
‘entirely’ in vague discussions. I had expressly fixed the meaning of 
‘sensible.’ Nevertheless, this gentleman also tediously attaches 
another meaning to this term, a meaning according to which the 
Germans of coarse or dull wit sometimes indecently, or even 
obscenely, speak extremely ‘sensible’ words in jest.
1
  
Although he implores God never to give him time to respond to such 
critics, Baumgarten’s bitterness is evident in his ‘Preface.’ 
That bitterness might explain why he removed the definition of the 
poem he had proposed in his dissertation from the Metaphysics (1739)2. 
                                                     
1
 Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysics, edited and translated by Courtney D. Fugate 
and John Hymers, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 85. I have modified Fugate’s and 
Hymer’s translation of sensitivam orationem perfectam (“perfect sensitive speech”) 
for consistency with Aschenbrenner and Holther’s translation of the Reflections on 
Poetry by replacing “sensitive” with “sensible.” 
2
 Baumgarten had included his earlier definition of the poem in the first edition of the 
Metaphysics (1739, §533), but removed it from the second edition (1743) and from 
subsequent editions. See Metaphysics, §433 (n. 24). 
Philosophica, 44, Lisboa, 2014, pp. 47-64.  
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Baumgarten also avoids any reference to perfection in the chapter on the 
senses he includes in the section on empirical psychology. This is 
surprising, because the suggestion that indistinct sensible representations 
could be perfect was one of the most innovative claims Baumgarten had 
made in the Reflections on Poetry. It represented a profound rejection of 
the idea associated with Leibniz and Wolff that only the clear and distinct 
cognition of the understanding and reason could be considered perfect3. 
Perhaps the criticism of his dissertation had scared Baumgarten away 
from the suggestion that anything sensible might be perfect. Yet the 
definitions of the poem and aesthetics that he had proposed in his 
dissertation reappear in his Aesthetics (1750/1758), which was published 
in the same year as the third edition of the Metaphysics. Why does 
Baumgarten discuss sensible perfection in the Reflections on Poetry and 
the Aesthetics, but not the Metaphysics? 
In what follows, I will explore Baumgarten’s discussions of sense 
and perfection in the Reflections on Poetry, Metaphysics, and Aesthetics. 
I will also consider some of the ways in which Georg Friedrich Meier and 
Immanuel Kant employed Baumgarten’s conception of sensible 
perfection in works on aesthetics and logic. My goal is to discover why 
Baumgarten thinks sensible perfection is so important in the Reflections 
on Poetry; why he does not discuss perfection in the sections of the 
Metaphysics that deal with sense; why the concept of sensible perfection 
reappears in the Aesthetics; and its influence upon Meier and Kant. In the 
end, I hope to show that the conception of sensible perfection that 
Baumgarten introduces in the Reflections on Poetry and Aesthetics is not 
entirely absent from the Metaphysics, but is downplayed because 
Baumgarten uses a different conception of perfection elsewhere in 
Metaphysics, which has to that take precedence over the one he had 
proposed in the Reflections on Poetry. His reformulation and extension of 
his original conception of perfection in the Aesthetics set the stage for a 
new way of thinking about sensibility that would eventually eclipse the 
Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy as a whole. 
                                                     
3
 For influential studies of Baumgarten’s relation to the Leibnizian-Wolffian school, 
see Ursula Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis: Die Rolle der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik 
des Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa, Bd. IX), 
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972, pp. 11-14, 37-50. See also Clemens Schwaiger, 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: Ein Intellektuelles Porträt, Stuttgart – Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011, pp. 17-26. Unfortunately, none of these 
studies emphasizes the role the concept of perfection (perfectio, Vollkommenheit) 
plays in Baumgarten’s aesthetics, though Schwaiger provides an instructive account 
of the role this concept plays in Baumgarten’s moral Philosophy. See Schwaiger, 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, pp. 155-166. 
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Sensible Perfection in the Reflections on Poetry 
Baumgarten discusses sensible perfection twice in the Reflections on 
Poetry. The first is in the discussion of sensible representations that 
follows his definition of the poem. In order to explain how sensible 
representations contribute to the “perfect sensible speech” of the poem, 
Baumgarten distinguishes between obscure, clear, confused, and distinct 
representations4. “In obscure representations,” he writes, “there are not 
contained as many representations of characteristic traits as would suffice 
for recognizing them and for distinguishing them from others, and as, in 
fact, are contained in clear representations (by definition).”5 He concludes 
that a poem whose representations are clear is more perfect than a poem 
whose representations are obscure; however, he denies that a poem whose 
representations are distinct is more perfect than a poem whose 
representations are confused. Baumgarten argues that confused 
representations are more poetic than distinct representations, because 
poetry does not strive for conceptual clarity in the same way that 
philosophy does. Philosophy renders concepts clear and distinct through 
the “discrimination of characteristics,” analyzing concepts and 
distinguishing their marks until there is nothing left to analyze6. 
Baumgarten does not consider the results of such analysis to be sensible 
or poetic, so he proposes a different standard for the clarity of sensible 
representations in poetry7. He argues that poetic representations are 
extensively clear when they gather together a variety of representations 
and represent more than other confused representations8. While 
extensively clear representations remain confused and lack the intensive 
clarity of distinct concepts, Baumgarten thinks they contribute to the 
sensible perfection of the poem, because “more is represented in a 
sensible way in extensively very clear representations than in those which 
are less clear”9. 
                                                     
4
 Alexander Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, edited and translated by Karl 
Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1954, §9. I have modified Aschenbrenner and Holter’s translation of oratio 
sensitive perfecta (“perfect sensate discourse”) for consistency with Fugate and 
Hymer’s translation of the Metaphysics by replacing “discourse” with “speech”. 
5
 Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, §13. 
6
 Ibid., §16. 
7
 Ibid., §14. 
8
 Ibid., §§16-17. 
9
 Ibid., §17. 
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The second discussion of sensible perfection comes at the very end 
of the Reflections on Poetry. After concluding his survey of the elements 
of the poem and rival definitions of poetry, Baumgarten declares that 
philosophical poetics is “the science guiding sensible speech to 
perfection”10. A science that guides sensible speech to perfection 
presupposes the existence of sensible representations, so he concludes 
that philosophical poetics must presuppose another science that he calls 
“aesthetics” after the Greek word for things perceived by the senses 
(αἰσθητά). Aesthetics is to guide the lower cognitive faculty (sensibility) 
in the cognition of sensible things in the same way that logic guides the 
higher cognitive faculty (understanding) toward philosophical knowledge 
of the truth11. While logicians are generally unconcerned with the 
language they use to communicate their knowledge, Baumgarten insists 
that aesthetics will have to take a greater interest in the presentation of 
sensible cognition, because language consists in “articulate sounds” that 
are perceived by the senses12. This leads him to distinguish between two 
parts of aesthetics. The first part, which he calls “general rhetoric”, is 
concerned with “the unperfected presentation of sensible 
representations”13. The second part, which deals with “the perfected 
presentation of sensible representations”, is called “general poetics”14. 
Baumgarten is confident that aesthetics will make a great contribution to 
philosophy by distinguishing “poetry and ordinary eloquence”, but he 
also seems to worry that distinguishing them will require “no less capable 
a geometer than did the frontiers of the Phrygians and the Mysians”15. 
 
 
                                                     
10
 Ibid., §115. 
11
 Ibid., §§115-116. The distinction between lower cognitive faculties (sense, 
imagination, memory, etc.) and higher cognitive faculties (understanding, reason, 
etc.) was common in the Leibnizian-Wolffian school. See Christian Wolff, 
Psychologica Empirica, included in Christian Wolff: Gesammelte Werke (II. Abt., 
Bd. 3), edited by Jean École et al., Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2001, §§54-55. 
12
 Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, §117. Baumgarten’s claims about the neglect 
of language in logic are not entirely accurate. Wolff thought language was 
sufficiently important to devote a chapter to the use of words in his German Logic. 
See Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen 
Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit (German 
Logic), included in Christian Wolff: Gesammelte Werke (I. Abt., Bd. 1), edited by 
Jean École et al., Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006, Ch. 2. 
13
 Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, §117. 
14
 Ibid., §117. 
15
 Ibid., §117. 
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Perfection and Sense in the Metaphysics 
Baumgarten has little to say about sensible perfection in his 
Metaphysics, but he does present a general definition of perfection at the 
end of the first part of the ‘Treatise on the Predicates of Beings’ that he 
includes in his ‘Ontology’. According to Baumgarten, perfection is the 
“agreement” of several things taken together16. This agreement must be 
determined “in conformity to the same ground”, so that that there is order 
in agreement and everything obeys a set of common rules. He goes on to 
distinguish simple and composite perfection, as well as internal and 
external perfection, but perhaps the most interesting conception of 
perfection Baumgarten introduces is “essential” or “transcendental” 
perfection, which results from the agreement of the essential 
determinations of a thing17. According to Baumgarten, “the essential 
determinations of each being agree with its essence (§ 63, §40) and its 
attributes (§50, §94)”, so that “every being is transcendentally perfect”18. 
Later, in the chapter on ‘The Real and the Negative’, he argues that every 
being is both “perfect (§99) and real (§137)”, so that the perfection of 
every being is “the agreement of realities in one reality (§ 94, §140)”19. 
He extends this model to the world as a whole in his ‘Cosmology,’ where 
he says that the most perfect world “is that in which the greatest of the 
most parts and the most of the greatest parts what are compossible in a 
world agree in as great a <unum> being as is possible in a world”20. 
Unfortunately, Baumgarten does not apply this conception of 
perfection to the senses in the chapters he devotes to the inferior 
cognitive faculty in the ‘Psychology’. It is curious that he does not say 
anything substantial about the perfection of the cognition of the inferior 
cognitive faculty, since he describes its cognition as obscure, confused, 
and indistinct, and these qualities are the reason why the inferior 
cognitive faculty is “inferior” when compared to the distinct cognition of 
the “superior” faculty21. It would be helpful if Baumgarten explained 
                                                     
16
 Ibid., §95. Baumgarten indicates that he has borrowed this definition of perfection 
from Christian Wolff and gives reasons why he has not seen fit to change it in the 
‘Preface’ to the second (1743) edition of the Metaphysics. See Baumgarten, 
Metaphysics, §88. 
17
 Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §98. 
18
 Ibid., §99. 
19
 Ibid., §141. 
20
 Ibid., §436. 
21
 Ibid., §520. He mentions perfection once in the section on the inferior cognitive 
faculty, when he explains that “a more lively perception is more perfect than a less 
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whether and to what extent obscurity, confusion, and indistinctness make 
the cognition of the inferior cognitive faculty imperfect, but he does not 
say anything on this subject, even when he argues that “there is 
something obscure in every sensation, and hence to some extent there is 
always an admixture of confusion in a sensation, even a distinct one” in 
the chapter on sense22. He even omits any reference to perfection in the 
definitions he proposes for aesthetics, which becomes “the science of 
knowing and presenting with regard to the senses”, as well as “the logic 
of the inferior cognitive faculty, the philosophy of the graces and muses, 
inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of the analogue 
of reason”23. Meier reformulates these definitions in his German 
translation of the Metaphysics (1766), so that aesthetics becomes “the 
science of the rules of the perfection of sensible knowledge” and “the 
science of the beautiful”24. These definitions are consistent with the ones 
Meier uses in his Anfangsgründe aller schönen Künste und 
Wissenschaften (1748-1750) and the ones Baumgarten employs in the 
Aesthetics. Yet they are nowhere to be found in any of the changes 
Baumgarten made to the various editions of the Metaphysics25. 
The only passages in the Metaphysics that are really helpful for 
understanding Baumgarten’s conception of sensible perfection are found 
in the short section on the faculty of judgment. All judgment, according 
to Baumgarten, derives from the perception of the perfections and 
imperfections of things26. Since the perception of perfection and 
imperfection may be more or less distinct, he distinguishes between 
sensible and intellectual judgment27. Sensible judgments are judgments of 
taste, so Baumgarten makes aesthetic criticism “the art of forming taste, 
or the art concerning judging sensitively and presenting its judgment”28. 
In a more general sense, criticism is “the science of the rules of distinctly 
judging perfection or imperfection”, though it is unclear whether 
                                                                                                                       
lively one (§§531, 185)”, but this is neither terribly informative nor of obvious 
significance for the perfection of the knowledge of the inferior cognitive faculty. 
See Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §532. 
22
 Ibid., §§520, 544, 624. 
23
 Ibid., §533.  
24
 Ibid. See also Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysik, translated by Georg Friedrich 
Meier, edited by Dagmar Mirbach, Jena: Dietrich Scheglmann Reprints, 2004, 
§395. 
25
 Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §533. 
26
 Ibid., §606. 
27
 Ibid., §607. 
28
 Ibid., §607. 
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Baumgarten thinks a distinct critical judgment can be rendered about 
sensible perceptions that are obscure, confused, and indistinct29. His 
discussion of mature judgment and delicate taste, which are more 
sensitive to the perfections of things that are partially perfect and partially 
imperfect, does not help answer this question30.  
Sensible Perfection in the Aesthetics 
Sensible perfection plays a more significant role and is discussed 
more frequently in Baumgarten’s Aesthetics than in either the Reflections 
on Poetry or the Metaphysics. Shortly after he defines aesthetics as “the 
science of sensible cognition”, Baumgarten identifies the end of this 
science as “the perfection of sensible cognition as such” or “beauty”31. He 
responds vigorously to those who think there can be no science of 
sensible cognition, arguing that it is contrary to reason to neglect any of 
the perfections of cognition32. Yet Baumgarten does not dwell on the 
paradox that perfect sensible cognition seems to represent. If sensible 
cognition is “by its very definition… the entirety of all representations 
that remain below the level of distinctness”, then it is difficult to see how 
it could be perfect. Can obscure, confused, and indistinct cognition be 
perfect in any meaningful sense?  
Baumgarten does not answer the question about the perfection of 
indistinct sensible cognition directly, but he goes on to describe the 
universal characteristics of beauty, which suggest that indistinct sensible 
cognition has many perfections indeed. Among the universal 
characteristics of beauty, he lists the beauty of things and thoughts, the 
beauty of order, and the beauty of signification33. The beauty of things 
and thoughts is a perfection of sensible cognition, because things and 
thoughts are the objects of our cognition. When the objects of sensible 
cognition are perfect, then the sensible cognition of those objects is also 
perfect, so it is beautiful. The beauty of order is a perfection of sensible 
cognition, because there is no perfection without order. When the objects 
of sensible cognition agree with one another, then sensible cognition is 
perfectly ordered, so it is beautiful. The beauty of signification is also a 
perfection of sensible cognition, because we cannot represent the beauty 




 Ibid., §608. 
31
 Alexander Baumgarten, Ästhetik (Teil I), edited and translated into German by 
Dagmar Mirbach, Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2007, §§1, 14. 
32
 Baumgarten, Ästhetik, §§5-10. 
33
 Ibid., §§18-20. 
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of the objects of sensible cognition and their order without signs. When 
the signs we use to represent sensible perfection agree with one another, 
then sensible cognition expresses itself eloquently, and it is beautiful. 
Baumgarten calls the beauty of things, order, and signification “the three 
universal graces of cognition”, because they are found in “almost all” 
(omni paene) perfect sensible cognition34. 
In addition to the universal characteristics of perfect sensible 
cognition, Baumgarten identifies a number of other perfections that 
sensible cognition might possess. In the first section alone, he says that 
richness, greatness, truth, clarity, certainty, and life “comprise the 
perfection of every cognition, insofar as they are in agreement with each 
other in representation”35. Some of these perfections are the subject of at 
least one chapter in the metaphysics – richness and greatness are the 
subject of two chapters each, truth is the subject of another chapter – 
while others are frequently discussed in chapters devoted to other 
subjects36. There can be no doubt that richness, greatness, truth, clarity, 
certainty, and life are important sensible perfections, even if they do not 
have the same extension as the beauty of things and thoughts, the beauty 
of order, and the order of signification. 
Two more sensible perfections are worth noting. In the first chapter 
of the Aesthetics, Baumgarten says “the beauty of sensible cognition and 
the tastefulness of things that are thought are composite perfections”, 
because “no simple perfection becomes an appearance for us”37. This 
suggests the perfections of sensible cognition may be simple or complex, 
but excludes the possibility that simple sensible perfections appear to us. 
Since appearance is defined as “the unified agreement of thoughts among 
themselves” in the Aesthetics, every appearance must involve the 
agreement of several thoughts38. The perfection of the sensible cognition 
depends on the degree to which the different thoughts that constitute the 
appearance agree with one another. Sensible cognition is less perfect 
when there is disagreement in appearances, but Baumgarten is willing to 
                                                     
34
 Ibid., §§17, 20. 
35
 Ibid., §22.  
36
 See, for example, Baumgarten, Ästhetik, Teil I:IX, XII, XV, XVII, XXVII; Teil 
II:XXXVII-XXXVIII.  
37
 Baumgarten, Ästhetik, §24. 
38
 Ibid., §18. Baumgarten treats “appearances” (apparitiones) as a synonym for 
“sensations” (sensationes) in Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §534, which suggests that 
he is employing a different conception of appearances in the Aesthetics, where the 
term “appearance” refers to “the universal agreement of thoughts among 
themselves”. 
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admit that there are many exceptions to the rules of beauty, and that some 
disagreement in appearances does not detract from the overall perfection 
of sensible cognition39. Later in the Aesthetics, Baumgarten will explain 
that absolute formal perfection is not necessary in metaphysics or 
aesthetics, because there is also a material perfection in the representation 
of individual things that should not be dismissed40. 
Sensible Perfection in Meier and Kant 
Before drawing any conclusions about Baumgarten’s conception of 
sensible perfection, it is worthwhile to consider the use Meier and Kant 
make of this concept. We have already seen that Meier makes aesthetics 
the science of perfect sensible cognition in his translation of 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics; however, he also uses the concept of sensible 
perfection extensively in his Anfangsgründe aller schönen Künste und 
Wissenschaften (1748-50) and in his Vernunftlehre (1752). Kant rarely 
mentions the concept of sensible perfection in his published works, but he 
discusses it frequently in his lectures on logic, which were based on 
Meier’s Vernunftlehre. The different ways in which Meier and Kant use 
this concept highlights a tension in Baumgarten’s thought and sets the 
stage for Kant’s more radical break with the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
philosophy. 
One of the first things that becomes apparent in Meier’s work is that 
he uses the concept of perfection much more promiscuously than 
Baumgarten does. On the first page of the ‘Introduction’ to the 
Anfangsgründe, Meier talks about the perfection of appearance, the 
perfection of beautiful cognition, and the perfection of the intellectual 
world41. He goes on to discuss the perfection of aesthetic cognition, 
which he says is “perfectly analogous” to the perfection of logical 
cognition, even though aesthetics is concerned with the sensible cognition 
of the lower cognitive faculty rather than the philosophical cognition of 
the higher cognitive faculty42. This analogy guarantees the possibility of 
the science of sensible cognition Baumgarten had proposed. According to 
Meier, this science concerns itself with “the rules of perfections and 
beauties in general” as well as “the doctrine of the soul, especially 
                                                     
39
 Baumgarten, Ästhetik, §§24-25. 
40
 Ibid., §§559-565. 
41
 Georg Friedrich Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (2. Auf, 1. 
Teil), Magdeburg: Hemmerde, 1754, §1. 
42
 Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften, §§2-3. 
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concerning the nature of the lower sensible cognitive faculty”43. Each of 
these tasks is reflected in the structure of the Anfangsgründe. Many of the 
chapters of the first volume are devoted to specific aesthetic perfections, 
while the second volume addresses the specific faculties that belong to 
the lower cognitive faculty. It should also be noted that the aesthetic 
perfections that Meier discusses in the first volume of the Anfangsgründe 
– richness, greatness, probability, vivacity, certainty, and sensible life – 
are very similar to the ones Baumgarten identifies in the Aesthetics44. 
This should not be surprising, as Meier acknowledges his debt to 
Baumgarten in his ‘Preface’ and also in the ‘Introduction’ to the 
Anfangsgründe45. 
Meier’s preoccupation with perfection is also evident in the 
Vernunftlehre, where he discusses the perfection of cognition in general 
and the difference between the logical and aesthetic perfections of 
cognition. According to Meier, cognition is perfect when a variety of 
things agree in a certain respect in our cognition46. Cognition is logically 
perfect when that agreement is distinct and aesthetically perfect when it is 
beautiful but indistinct47. The Vernunftlehre is an investigation of learned 
cognition, which is a kind of logically perfect cognition, so Meier does 
not have a great deal to say about aesthetically perfect cognition; yet he is 
eager to show that logically perfect cognition can be combined with 
aesthetically perfect cognition to produce a kind of cognition that is both 
learned and beautiful48. After listing all of the other logical perfections of 
cognition – extension, magnitude, truth, distinctness, certainty, and 
practicality – he argues that learned cognition that possesses all of the 
logical perfections is still not as perfect as cognition that is both learned 
and beautiful49. This is a strange thing to say, since the logical 
                                                     
43
 Ibid., §§3-5. 
44
 Although Baumgarten’s and Meier’s lists of sensible perfections are similar, they 
are not identical. Baumgarten includes “clarity” (claritas) in his list, but Meier 
does not. Meier also distinguishes between “vivacity” (Lebhaftigkeit) and 
“sensible life” (sinnlichen Leben) in a way that Baumgarten does not. Finally, 
Meier replaces Baumgarten’s “truth” (veritas) with “probability” (Wahr-
scheinlichkeit). 
45
 Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen wissenschaften, ii, §6. 
46
 Georg Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Kant’s Gesammelte 
Schriften, Bd. XVI), edited by Erich Adickes, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1924, 
§22. 
47
 Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, §§19, 21.  
48
 Ibid., §24. 
49
 Ibid., §24-§30. 
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distinctness of learned cognition would seem to exclude the aesthetic 
indistinctness of beautiful cognition. 
Kant seems to have recognized this difficulty in Meier’s account of 
logical and aesthetic perfection. After dutifully rehearsing Meier’s 
account of the perfections of cognition in his logic lectures, Kant 
expresses some doubts about the idea that any cognition could be both 
logically and aesthetically perfect. Commenting on Meier’s claim that 
“we ought to make our cognition at once logically and aesthetically 
perfect”, Kant asks “But who can achieve this?” “In each part of our 
cognition”, he continues,  
such a thing can very often fail to occur. If I want, e.g., to make a 
book logically perfect, then I do not have to produce everywhere at 
the same time the aesthetic and practical, nor can I. And if, on the 
other hand, I want to make a book aesthetically or practically perfect, 




He takes a similar view of the combination of aesthetic and logical clarity 
in the ‘Preface’ to the first (A) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
where he says he excluded examples and illustrations from the text, not 
only because they would make the work too long, but also because he 
feared aesthetic considerations would “paint over and make 
unrecognizable” the logical structure of his argument with their “bright 
colors”51. While he does not claim logical and aesthetic perfection are 
mutually exclusive as a matter of principle, Kant is much less optimistic 
than Meier about the possibility of combining them. 
Kant also came to doubt the idea that distinctness and indistinctness 
are sufficient to distinguish between sensible and intellectual cognition52. 
Although he attributes this idea to Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten and 
Meier are equally subject to the objections Kant raises against this 
“merely logical” distinction in his inaugural dissertation, in the first 
Critique, in the Prolegomena, and in later works like On a Discovery and 
                                                     
50
 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic (The Blomberg Logic. 1770s), edited and 
translated by J. Michael Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
p. 43 (XXIV: 59). 
51
 See, for example, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, edited and translated 
by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, Axvii-Axviii. 
52
 See, for example, Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics (Metaphysik L1, c. 
1770s), edited and translated by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 58 (XXVIII: 240). 
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the drafts for his essay on the progress of metaphysics53. Instead of using 
distinctness to separate what is sensible and what is intellectual in our 
cognition, Kant distinguishes them by their origin and content54. Sensible 
cognition is sensible because it has its origin in the faculty of sensibility, 
while intellectual cognition is intellectual because it derives from the 
understanding. The faculty of sensibility provides us with intuitions, 
while concepts are functions of the understanding. Intuitions and 
concepts may be more or less distinct, but intuitions are not sensible 
because they are indistinct, nor are concepts intellectual because they are 
distinct. The defenders of Leibniz and Wolff, like Mendelssohn and 
Eberhard, thought Kant was too quick to dismiss the role distinctness 
plays in distinguishing the sensible and the intellectual, but the 
subsequent history of German philosophy shows that their objections fell 
on deaf ears55.  
Conclusions 
Having surveyed Baumgarten’s discussions of sensible perfection in 
the Reflections on Poetry, Metaphysics, and Aesthetics, and taken stock of 
Meier’s and Kant’s use of this concept, we are now in a position to draw 
some conclusions. The first concerns the conception of sensible 
perfection Baumgarten employs in the Reflections on Poetry; the second 
concerns the conception of perfection he uses in the Metaphysics and its 
absence from the chapter on the senses; the third concerns the return of 
Baumgarten’s conception of sensible perfection in the Aesthetics; and the 
fourth concerns the reception of Baumgarten’s conception of sensible 
                                                     
53
 Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy Before 1770 (Inaugural Dissertation, 
1770), edited and translated by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 387 (II: 394-395). See also Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, A44/B62. See also Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy After 
1781 (Prolegomena, 1783; On a Discovery, 1790; What Real Progress, c. 1793), 
edited and translated by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, pp. 85, 310, 368 (IV: 290, VIII: 219-220, XX: 277). 
54
 See, for example, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A50/B74-A52/B76. 
55
 Moses Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s Existence, translated by 
Daniel O. Dahlstrom and Corey Dyck, Dodrecht: Springer, 2011, pp. 101-103. See 
also Johann August Eberhard, “Über den wesentlich Unterschied der Erkenntnis 
durch die Sinne und durch den Verstand,” included in Immanuel Kant: Der Streit 
mit Johann August Eberhard, edited by Marion Lauschke and Manfred Zahn, 
Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, pp. 60-69. See also Frederick Beiser, The Fate of 
Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Cambridge: Harvard University 
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perfection, whose influence can be found in Kant’s conception of 
sensibility, despite his objections to Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and 
Meier.  
The conception of sensible perfection that Baumgarten employs in 
the Reflections on Poetry is based on Leibniz’s and Wolff’s claim that a 
concept is adequate (adequate, vollständig) when we have clear and 
distinct knowledge of all of the marks that constitute that concept56. 
Christian Wolff uses this conception of cognitive perfection to distinguish 
the lower cognitive faculty (sense) from the higher cognitive faculty 
(understanding) in his empirical psychology. The former is concerned 
with obscure and confused concepts, while the latter is concerned with 
distinct notions57. Wolff’s distinction suggests that only intellectual 
cognition can be perfect, but Baumgarten introduces a different standard 
of perfection for sensible cognition in the Reflections on Poetry. He 
argues that sensible cognition, sensible representations, and the sensible 
speech of rhetoric and poetry can be considered perfect, so long as they 
are clear. An orthodox Wolffian would have rejected this claim as absurd, 
because it implies that confused and indistinct cognition can still be 
perfect; yet Baumgarten remains committed to view that perfect sensible 
representations are clear and confused but not distinct. He also devises a 
new way of clarifying sensible representations that avoids the analytical 
method Wolff had proposed. Instead of proceeding like a philosopher and 
distinguishing the marks that constitute a concept, Baumgarten suggests 
that sensible representations can be clarified by increasing the number of 
marks a representation contains58. As an example, he cites Homer’s 
reference to “leaders and chieftans, commanders of ships, and all the 
fleet” in the second book Iliad59. While some readers might think 
everything after “leaders” is redundant, Baumgarten thinks the passage is 
improved by mentioning “chieftans” and “commanders”, because the 
point Homer wishes to emphasize becomes clearer. This shows that the 
perfection of sensible representations derives from their extensive clarity, 
rather than the intensive clarity that leads to distinct philosophical 
cognition. 
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Baumgarten does not emphasize his revision of the Wolffian 
conception of cognitive perfection in the Metaphysics, because he 
employs a different conception of perfection in the sections on ontology 
and cosmology. This conception of perfection is defined by agreement 
rather than distinctness or beauty. Perfection as agreement takes 
precedence over perfection as distinctness or beauty, because ontology 
and cosmology are more fundamental parts of metaphysics than empirical 
psychology. Ontology is concerned with “the more general predicates of 
a being”, while cosmology is “the science of the general predicates of the 
world”60. Empirical psychology deals with the mind and the perfections 
of its cognition, but the mind has to exist and be a part of the world 
before it can have distinct or beautiful cognition. In order for the mind to 
exist and be a part of the world, its different elements have to agree with 
one another in their essence61. That is why perfection as agreement takes 
precedence over perfection as distinctness or beauty; yet the former does 
not exclude the latter as a matter of principle. Although Baumgarten does 
not use the language of sensible perfection very often in his discussion of 
empirical psychology, he connects sensible cognition to a kind of 
perfection when he says a lively sensible perception is more perfect than 
a less lively one. Later, in the discussion of taste in the section on the 
faculty of judgment, he connects the conception of perfection as 
agreement to the conception of sensible perfection more explicitly62. 
These examples indicate that Baumgarten still thinks that sensible 
perfection is possible, but there are also less explicit appeals to sensible 
perfection in the Metaphysics. Baumgarten uses the same distinctions 
between obscure, clear, confused, and distinct cognition, as well as the 
distinction between intensive and extensive clarity, that he had employed 
in his discussion of the perfection of sensible representations in the 
Reflections on Poetry, which suggests that he did not abandon the 
concept of sensible perfection in the Metaphysics. He simply avoided 
referring to a conception of cognitive perfection that might conflict with 
the ontological and cosmological conception of perfection he employs 
elsewhere in the book. 
Baumgarten does not need to avoid the ontological and cosmological 
conception of perfection in the Aesthetics, so he returns to the standards 
of cognitive perfection he had introduced in the Reflections on Poetry. He 
identifies aesthetics as the science that will guide the indistinct cognition 
of the lower cognitive faculty to perfection, just as he did in the 
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Reflections on Poetry, but he does not limit his discussion of sensible 
perfection to extensive clarity63. Instead, Baumgarten introduces a 
number of additional perfections of sensible cognition and develops them 
at considerable length. His discussions of the beauty of things and 
thoughts, the beauty of order, and the beauty of signification show perfect 
sensible cognition is concerned with the beauty of external objects and 
the way they are represented in the mind; that ugly things may be 
represented in beautiful ways in perfect sensible cognition; that perfect 
sensible cognition respects the order of appearances and their agreement 
with one another; and that perfect sensible cognition represents itself 
eloquently in speech and writing64. His treatment of the richness, 
greatness, truth, certainty, and life of sensibly perfect cognition 
throughout the Aesthetics also suggests that the perfections of sensible 
cognition extend far beyond clarity. However, the most important way 
Baumgarten develops his conception of sensible perfection in the 
Aesthetics is his identification of perfect sensible cognition and beauty, 
which is entirely absent from the Reflections on Poetry. A closely related 
definition can be found in the Metaphysics, where Baumgarten calls 
beauty “the perfection observable by taste in the broader sense”, but this 
could leave readers with the impression that aesthetics is a part of 
cosmology that describes the pleasing qualities of things65. By making 
beauty the perfection of sensible cognition in the Aesthetics, Baumgarten 
completes his revision of the standards of cognitive perfection that 
Leibniz and Wolff had introduced, setting the stage for a very different 
way of thinking about sensibility. 
Meier made the most of Baumgarten’s conception of sensible 
perfection in his Anfangsgründe and Vernunftlehre, promoting his new 
science of aesthetics and urging his readers to combine the perfections of 
sensible and intellectual cognition. Yet one could argue that Kant is 
actually the most influential figure in the reception of Baumgarten’s 
conception of sensible perfection. Even though he rejected the idea that 
sensible cognition is confused and indistinct and reduced the role that 
cognitive perfection played in aesthetics and logic, Kant accepted one of 
the most radical implications of Baumgarten’s conception of sensible 
perfection and pursued its consequences more persistently than either 
                                                     
63
 Baumgarten, Ästhetik, §17. 
64
 Ibid., §§18-20. 
65
 Ibid., §14. See also Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §662. Dagmar Mirbach provides a 
helpful commentary on the relationship between beauty as “perfectio 
phaenomenon” and beauty as “perfectio cognitionis sensitivae” in her introduction 
to the Aesthetics. See Baumgarten, Ästhetik, LIII-LIX. 
62 J. Colin McQuillan 
Baumgarten or Meier. If Baumgarten’s conception of sensible perfection 
is intended to distinguish sensible and intellectual cognition, then Kant is 
the philosopher who faced that challenge most squarely. By focusing on 
the differences in the origin and content of sensible intuition and pure 
concepts of the understanding, Kant was able to separate the two sources 
of our cognition more decisively than any of his predecessors66. The 
differences between Kant’s account of the difference between sensibility 
and the understanding and the account of the difference between the 
lower and higher cognitive faculties that Baumgarten inherited from 
Wolff should not lead us to discount Baumgarten’s influence on Kant or 
the way his account of sensible perfection set the stage for his more 
radical distinction between intuitions and concepts. Baumgarten’s 
conception of sensible perfection anticipates Kant’s account of the 
difference between sensibility and the understanding in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, because it began the process of separating sensibility from 
the intellectualizing tendencies of Leibniz and Wolff. 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important concepts Baumgarten introduces in his 
Reflections on Poetry is the concept of sensible perfection. It is surprising that 
Baumgarten does not elaborate upon this concept in his Metaphysics, since it 
plays such an important role in the new science of aesthetics that he proposes at 
the end of the Reflections on Poetry and then further develops in the Aesthetics. 
This article considers the significance of the absence of sensible perfection from 
the Metaphysics and its implications for Baumgarten’s aesthetics, before turning 
to the use Meier and Kant make of Baumgarten’s concept. In the end, this article 
shows that Baumgarten did not abandon his conception of sensible perfection in 
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the Metaphysics, though its influence declined significantly after Kant rejected 
the idea that sensibility and the understanding could be distinguished by the 
perfections of their cognition. 
Keywords: Baumgarten, Kant, aesthetics, sensibility, perfection 
RESUMO 
Um dos mais importantes conceitos que Baumgarten introduz nas suas 
Reflexões sobre Poesia é o conceito de perfeição sensível. É surpreendente que 
Baumgarten não elabore acerca deste conceito na sua Metafísica, visto possuir 
um papel tão importante na nova ciência estética que ele propõe no final das 
Reflexões sobre Poesia e que aprofunda na Estética. Este artigo aborda o 
significado da ausência da perfeição sensível na Metafísica e as suas implicações 
para a estética de Baumgarten, antes de analisar o uso que Meier e Kant fazem 
do conceito de Baumgarten. No final, este artigo mostra que Baumgarten não 
abandonou a sua concepção de perfeição sensível na Metafísica, apesar de a sua 
influência ter diminuído significativamente após Kant ter rejeitado a ideia de que 
a sensibilidade e o entendimento poderiam distinguir-se pelas perfeições da 
respectiva cognição. 
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